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Abstract
This paper takes a novel approach to es ma ng bankruptcy costs by inference from market prices
of equity and put op ons using a dynamic structural model of capital structure. This approach avoids
the selec on bias of looking at ﬁrms in or near default and therefore permits theories of ex ante capital
structuredetermina ontobetested. Weiden fysigniﬁcantcrosssec onalvaria oninbankruptcycosts
across industries and relate these to speciﬁc ﬁrm characteris cs. We ﬁnd that asset vola lity and growth
op onshavesigniﬁcantposi veimpacts,whiletangibilityandsizehavenega veimpacts. Ourbankruptcy
cost variable es mate signiﬁcantly nega vely impacts leverage ra os. This nega ve impact is in addi on
to that of other ﬁrm characteris cs such as asset intangibility and asset vola lity. The results provide
strong support for the tradeoﬀ theory of capital structure.
1 Introduc on
Bankruptcy costs, that is the loss in value that occurs when ownership of a ﬁrm is transferred from equi-
tyholders to debtholders, are one of the two key determinants in the tradeoﬀ theory of capital structure,
which has been at the forefront of ﬁnance research over the last 50 years. According to the theory, these
costs are to be weighed against the advantage of interest deduc bility of corporate debt. Of course, obtain-
ing precise es mates of these key parameters is crucial in determining the validity of the theory. While a lot
of progress has been made with respect to es ma ng the corporate tax advantage of debt, the magnitude
and cross-sec onal distribu on of bankruptcy costs have remained challenges to researchers.
*This paper has been presented at the University of Hong Kong, HKUST, the Goethe University Frankfurt the Frankfurt School
of Management, the University of Zürich, the European Finance Associa on, the European Winter Finance Conference and the
IDC Rothschild Ceasarea Conference. We appreciate the helpful comments of Rudiger Frey, Jean-Charles Rochet and Toni Whited,
members of the seminar audiences and discussants Patrick Bolton, Egor Matveyev and Mar n Schmalz.
1One approach to obtain es mates is by directly using samples of ﬁrms that have gone bankrupt. This proce-
dure has several main diﬃcul es. First, it is almost impossible to get precise data on the magnitude of costs
suchaslegalcostsforallinvolvedpar esinlargesamples. Second,onewouldneedtohaveacompletelistof
all costs incurred in bankruptcy, both direct as well as indirect. This is a formidable task. For example, some
bankruptcy components will be borne by third par es, such as employees. Other bankruptcy costs may rep-
resent opportunity costs, such as foregone proﬁtable projects. Third, there is a crucial selec on bias. One
would expect that bankruptcy costs and the probability of bankruptcy would be nega vely correlated which
therefore implies that, relying only on bankrupt ﬁrms gives a biased ex-ante es mate. This would result in
understa ng the true bankruptcy costs.
An alterna ve to directly measuring these costs is to use market prices of debt instruments to infer them.
This,however,iscomplicatedbythelackofcleanmarketpricesforcorporatedebt. Also,debthasfrequently
a very opaque structure with signiﬁcant heterogeneity due to contractual diﬀerences. Furthermore, large
components of corporate liabili es, e.g. bank debt, are usually not traded at all. All of these cri cisms
apply to credit default swaps (CDS) as well, with the further complica on that a CDS only applies to a single
reference en ty. It would be diﬃcult to pick the appropriate reference en tyex ante. Finally it is well known
that counterparty risk is a concern with respect to the use of CDS prices.
Thecleanestsetofmarketpricesthatcouldpoten allybeusedtoextractbankruptcycosts,arethoserelated
to a ﬁrm's equity. This approach is frustrated by the fact that, without further reﬁnancing, the costs of
bankruptcy are not reﬂected in equity prices, since they are not borne by equityholders ex post. However, in
amorerealis csitua on,whereﬁrmsfacecon nuedreﬁnancingneeds,equitypriceswillreﬂectbankruptcy
costs, even in the absence of any new equity issues. To see this, consider a ﬁrm that wishes to roll over its
maturingdebtbyissuingnewdebtwiththesamefacevalueandthesamecouponrate. Ofcoursethemarket
value of the new debt will in general not equal the required redemp on payment to the old debtholders. If
thediﬀerenceisposi ve,itcanbepaidouttoequityholdersasadividend;ifnega ve,itmustbeﬁnancedvia
a reduced dividend or a new share issue. Under this scenario, bankruptcy costs are reﬂected in the market
value of the new debt and therefore in the net distribu on to the equityholders. Since the ex-ante equity
price reﬂects future debt reﬁnancings, it therefore must incorporate bankruptcy costs.
This is the essence of our approach. We use a structural model of con nuous debt reﬁnancing, due to
Leland (1994) and Leland (1998) to back out bankruptcy costs from equity securi es. We do not rely solely
on common equity prices but augment our es ma on procedure through the observa on of equity put
op on prices. Out-of-the-money put prices are very sensi ve to bankruptcy states and aﬀord a considerable
improvement in accuracy over relying solely on common stock prices. In doing so, the paper derives put
op on prices for this structural model of debt reﬁnancing. As a byproduct of the es ma on procedure,
we also obtain  me-series es mates of underlying unlevered asset prices which not only include assets in
place, but growth opportuni es as well. Our bankruptcy cost es mates are at the upper end of the range of
2previously es mated averages but they reﬂect considerable cross-sec onal varia on by industry. This paper
is the ﬁrst to examine the extent and implica ons of this heterogeneity.
We believe our paper makes important methodological and empirical contribu ons. Our methodology uses
stockpricesandputop onstobackoutbankruptcycostsandotherstructuralparameters,suchasbankruptcy
thresholds, distance to default and hidden debt. Using put op ons is crucial since stock prices alone do
not provide enough sensi vity to underlying structural parameters. The method is applied to es mate
bankruptcy costs during the ﬁnancial crisis period 2008 to 2010. In this period, there was considerable
varia on of put op on prices and vola lity that facilitates robust es ma on of bankruptcy costs. Many ﬁrms
were pushed to higher risks of default during this period.
Oures matesarereasonableandexhibitconsiderableindustryvaria on. Firstofall,weﬁndthatbankruptcy
costs are strongly and posi vely related to distance to default over the relevant range. We relate these
bankruptcy cost es mates to ﬁrm characteris cs. We ﬁnd that bankruptcy costs are strongly posi vely re-
lated to the underlying asset vola lity, and nega vely to ﬁrm size and asset tangibility. We ﬁnd that market
to book ra os increase bankruptcy costs signiﬁcantly, which provides strong support for the hypothesis that
growth op ons are lost in bankruptcy.
Second, we explore the determinants of leverage ra os via a cross-sec onal analysis. When we include our
es mates of bankruptcy costs we improve the explanatory power in the cross-sec on considerably over the
previous literature. Our direct measure of bankruptcy costs is nega vely related to leverage, which provides
considerable support for the tradeoﬀ theory of capital structure. Also, the asset vola lity es mates show
up strongly in the cross-sec onal rela onship as having a nega ve eﬀect on leverage. We ﬁnd that mar-
ket to book ra os have further eplanatory power for leverage in addi on to that already accounted for by
bankruptcy cost es mates.
Third,ourmethodisalsoextendedtoprovidees matesofhiddenliabili es,whichareeitheroﬀthebalance
sheet, or diﬃcult to measure, such as health care liabili es or employee labor legacy contracts. We ﬁnd
considerable cross-sec onal varia on here as well.
The literature on bankruptcy costs has a long history. One important approach looks at direct costs of ﬁrms
that have gone bankrupt. Weiss (1990) evaluates 37 Chapter 11 bankruptcies between 1980 and 1986 and
ﬁnds direct costs of bankruptcy average 3.1% of the book value of debt plus the market value of equity. Ang
et al. (1982) report bankruptcy costs of 7.5% of total liquida on value of assets for 86 liquida ons between
1963 and 1979. However, for small ﬁrms bankruptcy fees might wipe out 100% of the assets. Bris et al.
(2006) consider 300 cases of mostly smaller nonpublic ﬁrms between 1995-2001. They ﬁnd that in 68% of
Chapter 7 cases, the bankruptcy fees exceeded the en re estate.
A series of papers have also a empted to measure indirect bankruptcy costs. One diﬃculty lies in dis n-
guishing actual distress costs from the economic factors ul mately responsible for pushing the ﬁrm into
3diﬃculty. Altman (1984) deals with this by comparing expected proﬁts to actual proﬁts for the 3 years prior
to bankruptcy. He ﬁnds an average cost of 10% of ﬁrm value measured just prior to bankruptcy. Combined
direct and indirect costs average 16.7% of ﬁrm value for this sample. Andrade & Kaplan (1998) consider
31 ﬁrms that have become ﬁnancially distressed a er a management buyout or a leveraged recapitaliza on
between 1980 and 1989 but were not economically distressed. They ﬁnd costs of ﬁnancial distress between
10% and 20% of ﬁrm value. These es mates are used by Almeida & Philippon (2007) to calculate the ex-
ante value of distress costs by mul plying them by the risk neutral default probabili es obtained from CDS
spreads. These ex ante es mates amount to an average of 4.5%. Elkamhi et al. (2012) point out that es -
matesbyAndrade& Kaplan(1998)should be applied toex-postassetvaluesatthe  me of bankruptcy. They
therefore extend this approach using a structural model, which allows them to map the ex-post bankruptcy
costpercentagestoex-antepercentagesandﬁndthattheyaretoolowtosupportcommonlyobservedlever-
age ra os. Nevertheless they s ll rely on the original es mates by Andrade & Kaplan (1998).
Korteweg (2010) uses market prices of debt and equity of ﬁrms close to bankruptcy to es mate bankruptcy
costs from the net-beneﬁts to leverage. This is based on the presump on that ﬁrms close to bankruptcy
have lost all the tax beneﬁts of debt and the net-beneﬁts to leverage reﬂect bankruptcy costs alone. The
author ﬁnds bankruptcy costs amount to 15 to 30%. Davydenko et al. (2012) back out distress costs from
market value changes upon the announcement of default. Assuming that investors do not fully an cipate
default,distresscostscanbees matedfromthechangeinthemarketvalueoftheﬁrmuponannouncement.
They ﬁnd average costs of distress of 21%, lower costs of 20.2% for highly-levered ﬁrms and higher costs for
investment-grade ﬁrms (28.8%). Once again, these es mates may be biased since severely distressed ﬁrms
are likely to be the ones with low bankruptcy costs.
Ashasbeenrecognized(Glover,2011),usinges matesofincurredbankruptcycostsfromdefaultedﬁrmscan
poten ally bias es mates downwards as one might expect that ﬁrms with lower bankruptcy costs are more
likely to run the risks of going into default. Glover (2011) uses simulated method of moments to es mate
the parameters of a structural model in a general equilibrium se ng with macro variables es mated over
the business cycle. The model is embedded in a dynamic capital structure se ng that assumes the ﬁrm
trades oﬀ tax advantages with bankruptcy costs. The author ﬁnds average distress costs of 45% of ﬁrm value
whichcompareto25%forasampleofdefaultedﬁrms. Ourmodel, bycontrast, adoptsamoreparsimonious
approach, which does not rely on the tradeoﬀ theory for capital structure to hold for ﬁrms in the sample.
Thepaperproceedsasfollows. Sec on2containsthestructuralmodel. Sec on3documentsthees ma on
procedureanddescribesthedata. OurmainresultsarereportedinSec on4withrespecttobankruptcycosts
es mates and our cross-sec onal analysis of leverage ra os. Sec on 5 contains robustness tests showing
that our results are also reasonable in the context of a simulated sample. Sec on 6 concludes. Some of the
technical results are contained in an appendix.
42 Structural Model
In contrast to other approaches that rely on the prices of debt securi es or CDS our approach relies on the
useofmarketpricesofequityandequityderiva ves. Thisapproachhasseveraladvantages. First,manydebt
securi es are not traded at all. Second, even if they are traded, they are o en illiquid and characterized by
high bid-ask spreads. Also their prices depend on asset speciﬁc features, such as covenants and seniority.
Third, bankruptcy may be triggered by liabili es other than debt, such as deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans, for
which market prices do not exist. By contrast, equity is a residual claim and therefore its price is aﬀected by
bankruptcy, independently of the interac ons between diﬀerent liability categories.
Whileequityisclearlyaﬀectedbytheprobabilityofbankruptcy,itislessclearhowitisaﬀectedbybankruptcy
costs, since equityholders usually do not bear these costs ex post. However, in a dynamic model of capital
structure changes over  me, where ﬁrms must roll over debt, bankruptcy costs do aﬀect equity values since
theyimpactthepriceatwhichnewdebtcanbeissued. Wethereforerelyonaparsimoniousdynamiccapital
structuremodelinwhichﬁrmsmustcon nuouslyreﬁnanceaconstantfrac onoftheirdebtinordertokeep
book values constant.
Morespeciﬁcally,weconsiderthedebtofaﬁrmtoconsistofacon nuumofmaturi es,fromzerotoinﬁnity.
In any instant of  me, a frac on m of the outstanding face value of total debt, B, is re red. Thus, the face
value of the original debt that remains at  me t is equal to e−mtB. At any point in  me, the expiring debt is
replacedbyanewissuewithfacevaluemBofequalseniority. Thisnewissueconsistsagainofacon nuumof
maturi es, matching the original proﬁle of the debt before reﬁnancing. Thus, the total face value of debt,B,
remainsconstantover mewithanaveragematurityofM = 1=m. Thissta onarycapitalstructurepolicyhas
been used in Leland (1994) and Leland (1998).1 In this environment, the ﬁrm's aggregate coupon payment
per unit of  me is denoted by C and is assumed constant over  me. Thus, total payments to all debt holders
(debt replacement plus coupon) per unit of  me, dt, are given by (C + mB)dt.2
The equityholders control whether the ﬁrm enters bankruptcy or not, which is modeled as a ﬁrst passage
stopping mewhentheunleveredassetvaluestrikesthedefaultbarrier. Ingeneralequityholdersarewilling
to con nue to pay the interest costs in return for receiving cash ﬂows from earnings and reﬁnancings, un l
the unlevered value is suﬃciently low. Although our model does not include accumulated cash holdings
explicitly, we theorize that cash will not impact the default barrier signiﬁcantly as it will be op mal for equity
holders touse up cashﬁrstbefore hi ng the barrier (otherwise the cash will just transfer tothe debtholders
without beneﬁt to equity).
1Alterna ve capital structure dynamics with ﬁnite maturity debt can be found in Leland & To  (1996) and, with endogenous
roll-over decisions, in Dangl & Zechner (2007).
2Althoughwedonotincludeissuancecostsinourformalmodel,themodelcouldpoten allybeextendedeasilyinthisdirec on.
Speciﬁcallyonecouldaddasmallpropor onalcostinthecaseofnega vedividends(wheretheequityholdersareincreasingcapital).
Also debt issuance costs could be treated as an ou low that is propor onal to the face value of new debt issues.
5The ﬁrm is assumed to generate earnings before interest and taxes, EBIT, that follows a geometric Brownian
mo on with dri  ^ μ under the risk neutral measure, Q. Therefore, a er-tax earnings of an all-equity ﬁrm, Xt,
is given by Xt = (1   τ)EBIT, with Q-dynamics given by
dXt = ^ μXtdt + σXtdWt:
We deﬁne the value of unlevered assets, At, as the present value of future a er-tax earnings:
At  EQ
[∫ ∞
s=t
e−rsXsds
]
=
Xt
r   ^ μ
(1)
Let δ = Xt
At = r   ^ μ denote the earnings yield on the unlevered asset value. Thus, the dynamics of A under
the risk neutral measure sa siﬁes
dAt = (r   δ)Atdt + σAtdWt:
We now derive the value of the levered ﬁrm, Vt. As in the standard tradeoﬀ theory, the value of Vt is the
sumoftheunleveredassetvalueplusthepresentvalueoftax-shieldsminusthepresentvalueofbankruptcy
costs. Let G(t;At) be the price at  me t of an Arrow-Debreu security that pays one dollar at the  me of
bankruptcy, TB, when the unlevered asset value is AB. Using risk-neutral valua on, the price of this security
at  me t is
G(t;At)  EQ[e−rTB] (2)
=
(
At
AB
)−η(r)
(3)
where
η(r) =
μB +
√
μ2
B + 2rσ2
σ2
μB = r   δ  
σ2
2
Therefore the levered ﬁrm value at  me t is given by
V(At) = At +
τC
r
[1   G(t;At)]   αABG(t;At) (4)
where the second term is the present value of the tax shield reﬂec ng states in which the ﬁrm does not
go bankrupt. The third term represents the present value of bankruptcy costs, assuming that costs are a
propor on α of the value of the unlevered assets at the  me of default, AB. We do not explicitly allow for
6ﬁnancial distress costs aﬀec ng equityholders prior to default. Nevertheless our model is consistent with a
case in which these costs are accumulated and incurred at the  me of bankruptcy. Since the present value
of such costs impacts the price at which new debt can be issued, these costs therefore impact equityholders
before bankruptcy when they reﬁnance a propor on of the exis ng debt. In this sense our bankruptcy cost
es mate also captures distress costs borne by equityholders prior to default. Our model is also applicable to
a situa on where bankruptcy costs are nega ve.3 This might be a situa on where all ﬁnancial claimholders
are be er oﬀ in bankruptcy because of the ability to ex nguish a non-ﬁnancial liability.
As shown by Leland (1994), if equity holders default op mally the default boundary would be determined
by the smooth pas ng condi on as:
A∗
B =
C+mB
r+m η(z)   τC
r η(r)
1 + (1   α)η(z) + αη(r)
; (5)
where z = r + m. Intui vely, note that a nega ve bankruptcy cost, α < 0 implies that equity holders will
default later, since η(z) > η(r).
2.1 Valuing Corporate Securi es
We now use the above pricing equa ons to derive the values of corporate securi es and deriva ves thereof.
We begin with the value of corporate debt outstanding at  me t. Its value is the present value of the cash
ﬂows to debtholders if no default happens plus the value of bankruptcy costs incurred at default. Because
of the redemp on schedule of debt, for every dollar of face value at  me t, there will be e−m(TB−t) dollars of
theoriginalfacevalueoutstandingatthe me ofbankruptcy. The  metpriceof anArrowDebreuclaimthat
pays exactly one dollar at  me t if the debt claim remains outstanding at the  me of bankruptcy is given by
Gz(t;At) =
(
At
AB
)−η(z)
:
Moreover the market value of exis ng debt at  me t is given by
D(At) =
C + mB
z
[1   Gz(t;At)] + (1   α)ABGz(t;At): (6)
Sincethevalueofequity,S(At),isthediﬀerencebetweenthevalueoftheleveredﬁrmandthevalueofdebt,
we get
S(At) = V(At)   D(At) (7)
To see how bankruptcy costs enter the equity price, recall that αAB are the ex-post bankruptcy costs in the
event of default. The present value of these costs is given by αABG(t;At). Since the share of these costs
3Indeed we iden fy a nega ve bankruptcy cost for a small number of ﬁrms in our sample.
7bornebyexis ngdebtholdersisαABGz(t;At),itfollowsthattheremainingamount,αAB[G(t;At) Gz(t;At)],
is embedded in the equity price St.
In order to iden fy the parameters of the underlying structural model, we rely on equity as well as put
prices, since the la er are even more sensi ve than equity itself to bankruptcy probabili es and the costs of
bankruptcy. Puts derive their value from states where the stock price is below the strike price, and that
includes all the bankruptcy states. In contrast to equity, put prices are increasing with the likelihood of
bankruptcy. Thus, using both equity and put op ons simultaneously, can lead to more reliable es mates.
Furthermore, exchange-traded puts are standardized and thus counterparty risk and illiquidity are not an
issue.
In this framework put op ons are compound op ons, since equity itself is already a call op on on the asset
value. In addi on a put op on on a levered ﬁrm has features similar to a barrier/knock-out op on because
the ﬁrm can default before the op on expires. To derive a put pricing formula, we split the put payoﬀ at
maturity, PT, into a part that is paid out if the ﬁrm has not defaulted and a part paid in case the ﬁrm has
defaulted4:
PT = (K   S(AT))+1TB>T + K1TB≤T (8)
The put payoﬀ (8) formula reveals the compound nature of the op on since the equity value at maturity,
S(AT), is itself a func on of the underlying ﬁrm value. In order to derive the price of the op on at  me t,
we ﬁrst deﬁne A∗ as the  me-T asset value for which the op on is at the money (S(A∗) = K). The put price
can be derived as the discounted expected value of the strike price over asset paths in which the ﬁrm goes
bankruptpriortoexpira onplusthediscountedexpectedvalueofK Sinstateswheretheﬁrmdoesnotgo
bankrupt prior to expira on and AT  A∗. Hence the put price is equal to the following expecta on under
the risk neutral measure, Q.
Pt = e−r(T−t)EQ [(K   S(AT))1AT≤A∧TB>T] + Ke−r(T−t)EQ [1TB≤T]
In the appendix, we derive the following expression for the put price by subs tu ng the stock price into the
above formula and taking expecta ons. We employ several changes of measure to simplify the nota on.
The put has a posi ve value at expiry either when the ﬁrm goes bankrupt or when the op on expires in
the money but the ﬁrm has not gone bankrupt. In the former case, the stock price is zero, so the stock
price does not enter the put pricing equa on. However in the la er case it does. Deﬁne the set of sample
paths for which the op on is in the money and the ﬁrm does not default un l maturity of the op on as
YT = f(At)t∈[0;T] : AT  A∗;TB > Tg. Let 1YT be the indicator func on equal to one in the event states YT.
4To obtain an analy cal solu on, we assume the op ons are European and neglect the price diﬀerence to the American variety.
For instance, Bakshi et al. (2003) ﬁnd that the diﬀerence between the American op on implied vola lity and the European op on
implied vola lity is within the bid-ask spread.
8Theputpricingformulainvolvestakingexpecta ons,E(1YT),withrespecttothreeprobabilitymeasures. The
ﬁrst is a pricing measure with respect to the unlevered asset process, denoted by QA, the second, QG, is the
measure with respect to the claim whose price (under the risk neutral measure) isG(t;At), and the third, Qz
is the claim whose price (also under the risk neutral measure) is Gz(t;At). The put pricing formula is derived
in the appendix as
Pt =e−r(T−t)K(Q(YT) + Q(TB  T))   Ate−δ(T−t)QA(YT)
 
τC
r
(
e−r(T−t)Q(YT)   G(t;At)QG(YT)
)
+ αABG(t;At)QG(YT)
+
C + mB
z
(
e−r(T−t)Q(YT)   em(T−t)Gz(t;At)Qz(YT)
)
+ (1   α)ABem(T−t)Gz(t;At)Qz(YT) (9)
Equa on (9) together with the equity pricing formula (7) will now be used to es mate the underlying struc-
tural parameters, including bankruptcy costs, for our sample of ﬁrms.
3 Es ma on Method
We will use daily pricing data on equity and put op ons to es mate the structural parameters of the model.
Complica ngfactorsarethatthepricingequa onsarenon-linear,thatpricesareobservedwitherrorandthe
underlying asset value process is unobservable and is therefore a latent variable. We therefore use Kalman
ﬁltering techniques in the es ma on method.
3.1 Es ma on of Structural Parameters and The Asset Value Process
Sinceobservedpricesofstocksandputop onswillingeneraldiﬀerfromthetheore calpricesofourmodel,
we follow common prac ce and add an error term to the pricing equa ons (7) and (9). The observed pricing
errors may be due to various reasons such as microstructure eﬀects or non-synchronous trading of op ons
and stocks. We assume addi ve, normally distributed errors in the log-speciﬁca on for stock i:
si;t = s(Ai;t;θi) + eS
i;t
pi;t = p(Ai;t;Ki;θi) + eP
i;t (10)
such that pricing errors can be interpreted as percentage devia ons. s(Ai;t;θi) = logS(Ai;t;θi) where
S(Ai;t;θi) is derived from equa on (7) for the stock price of ﬁrm i as a func on of the asset value and the
model parameter vector θi. Similarly, p(Ai;t;Ki;θi) = logP(Ai;t;Ki;θi) denotes price of the put op on de-
rived in equa on (9) which depends on the asset value, the strike price, and the vector of model parameters
θi.
9Our speciﬁca on requires a non-standard es ma on technique, because we have both pricing errors as well
as an unobservable asset value in equa on (10). Hence, es ma on methods, such as standard maximum
likelihood as applied by Duan (1994) or Ericsson & Reneby (2005) are not applicable. We instead employ a
diﬀerent method. A Kalman-ﬁlter is used to back out the unobservable asset value for each date, and model
parameters and states are jointly es mated, using maximum likelihood.
For the  me series regression we need to specify the dynamics of the unlevered asset value process under
the physical measure. Assuming a constant market price of risk, λ, the P-dynamics are given by
dAt = μAtdt + σAtdwt; (11)
where μ = r   δ + λσ.
Let at = logAt. From Itō's lemma it follows that the the log-asset value process can be wri en in discrete
 me as
at =
(
μ  
σ2
2
)
Δt + at−1 + σ
p
Δt zt (12)
with zt
iid  N(0;1). Since pricing errors may be autocorrelated, we follow Bates (2000) in speciﬁying the
following process for the errors in equa on (10).
eS
i;t = ρi;SeS
i;t−1 + εS
i;t (13)
eP
i;t = ρi;PeP
i;t−1 + εP
i;t
Thesystemtobees matedcanberepresentedinstate-spaceformwiththeassetvalueprocess(12)andthe
AR(1)-process (13) forming the state equa on and the pricing equa ons (10) as the measurement equa on.
While the state equa on is linear the measurement equa on is non-linear. Therefore we employ a more
general method than the standard linear Kalman ﬁlter. Speciﬁcally, we use the unscented Kalman ﬁlter5
to deal with the non-linearity of the measurement equa on. The transforma on, on which the unscented
Kalman ﬁlter is based, enables the calcula on of unbiased es mates of the mean and covariance matrix of a
transformedvariable. Inthiscasethetransformedvariablesarethestockandputpriceswhichareafunc on
oftheassetvalue. Theunscentedtransforma oncapturesthetruemeanandcovariancematrixoftheprices
accurately to the third order, assuming as we have in our model that At is a geometric Brownian mo on. A
detailed descrip on of the unscented Kalman ﬁlter applied to our problem is given in appendix B.
5See Wan & Van Der Merwe (2001) for a comprehensive deriva on and Carr & Wu (2010) for an applica on to con nuous- me
ﬁnance-models.
103.2 Data
WeusedailyequityandputpricesfromMay2008toSeptember2010whichwereobtainedfromDatastream.
The necessary accoun ng data are from WorldScope. Our ini al sample consists of all cons tuent ﬁrms in
the S&P500 as of December 2007. Although these are rela vely large ﬁrms, two ﬁrms in this sample did
in fact ﬁle for chapter 11 bankruptcy protec on within the es ma on period: GM on June 1, 2009 and
CIT Group on November 1, 2009. Both ﬁrms were included in our es ma on procedure. We require the
ﬁrms to have at least 50 data points with a complete set of variables (stock and put op on prices, as well
as accoun ng variables) available. For every date, we use the closing stock price plus one put op on. We
require the op ons to sa sfy a minimum trading criterion. Speciﬁcally, we require the op on to fall in the
50th-percen le of the most traded op ons during that day. In addi on the op on prices must sa sfy the
basic intrinsic value condi on and, if several op ons are used, rela ve arbitrage bounds must hold. As a
consequence, the op on price series to be ﬁ ed consists of a series of diﬀerent put op ons with changing
maturi es and strike prices. We thus expect the model to ﬁt op on prices less well than stock prices.6
3.2.1 Parameters to be es mated
Our structural model assumes that the principal amount of debt outstanding as well as the coupon rate,
the tax rate and the average debt maturity is constant. In reality, ﬁrms do change their capital structures
and, in fact, several restructuring events are observed for many of the ﬁrms in our sample. We therefore
use the most recent balance sheet value of total liabili es, which is available at quarterly frequency, as the
representa on of the book value of debt outstanding.7 With the book value of debt changing over  me, it is
consistent that also the coupon, the debt maturity, the default barrier and the tax shield change over  me.
Toaccountforthis,weassumethatthecouponandthetaxshieldareaﬃnefunc onsofthelatestbookvalue
ofdebt. Furthermore,inthiscase,fromequa on(5),itcanbeshownthatthedefaultboundary,AB,isalsoan
aﬃnefunc onofthebookvalueofdebt. Toallowforthepossibilitythatdefaultisnotchosenfreelybyequity
holders ex post, but instead is inﬂuenced by debt covenants, oﬀ balance sheet liabili es and other ﬁnancial
fric ons,wees matetheaﬃneparameterdirectly. Weassumethattheﬁrmmaydefaultearlierthanexpost
op mal for equity holders and therefore allow the ﬁrm to default at the maximum between the es mated
boundaryandtheop malboundary. Thismethodcapturessomeabilitytoprecommitbyequityholders. We
also use a lower bound for the es mated boundary equal to one-half of the op mal boundary. Finally, the
averagedebtmaturityisinferredfromthelatestbalancesheetdataonthepropor onoflongandshortterm
debt.8 In order to derive the average maturity of total liabili es, we start by calcula ng a weighted average
6Since put op ons with diﬀerent strikes behave similarly with respect to changes in the asset value and in the other model
parameters, very li le would be gained by using more than one op on in the es ma on.
7A similar assump on is employed in Ericsson et al. (2007) and Elkamhi et al. (2012).
8While a typical ﬁrm usually has several diﬀerent kinds of debt outstanding our capital structure model considers only a single
bond. We treat all of them as a single debt issue. Consequently, the coupon rate and the maturity of debt have to be interpreted as
11of a long-term maturity, standardized to be ﬁve years, and a short-term maturity, standardized to one year,
where the weights are given by the frac on of long and short-term debt divided by total liabili es. Then, we
es mate the average maturity as an aﬃne func on of this weighted average of standard maturi es.
Table 1 summarizes our es ma on assump ons for the capital structure variables.
Table 1: Capital Structure Parameter Es mates
variable model es ma on speciﬁca on
Debt book value B Balance sheet value of total liabili es
Coupon C λCB
Tax shield τC λτB
Default barrier AB max
(
λBB; 1
2A∗
B
)
Average maturity m λmM where M =
longterm Debt
total Debt  5 + (1  
longterm Debt
total Debt )  1
In total there are twelve parameters to be es mated for each ﬁrm using the stock and put prices. Therefore
the es mated parameter vector can be described as θ = (μ;δ;σ2; λB; λC; λτ; λm;α;σS;σP; ρS; ρP).
4 Results
As men oned before, we started with the 500 cons tuents of the S&P 500 as of December, 2007. Out of
thisoriginalpopula on,wewereunabletoes matethemodelfor116ﬁrmssincetheylackedsomerelevant
data (such as op on prices or balance sheet liabili es). For 20 ﬁrms, the es ma on procedure did not con-
verge.9 Therefore we were le  with a remaining sample of 364 ﬁrms. For each ﬁrm we used the maximum
likelihood procedure to es mate bankruptcy costs and underlying asset vola li es, along with their associ-
ated conﬁdence bounds. In sec on 5 we performed a Monte Carlo simula on with a given bankruptcy cost
and asset vola lity and found that our es ma on procedure results in unbiased es mates and reasonably
 ght conﬁdence intervals.
To evaluate the marginal beneﬁt of using op on prices in addi on to the stock prices, we a empted to
es mate the parameters of the model with equity prices alone for a random subsample of the ﬁrms. In all
cases, the es ma on did not converge. Therefore we conclude that the use of op on prices is cri cal for
this model speciﬁca on. For our sample of 364 ﬁrms we evaluated the goodness-of-ﬁt by compu ng the
mean absolute value of the  me series errors for the two security prices. We then aggregated the mean
absolutepricingerrorsoverallﬁrmsbycompu ngtheoveralldistribu onofpricingerrorsforallﬁrmswhich
is indicated in Figure 1. We found that the most likely absolute error range was between 1 and 2 percent for
averages over the diﬀerent forms of debt.
9We did not ﬁnd any systema c pa ern amongst these ﬁrms that would indicate that they have biased our remaining sample in
any signiﬁcant way.
12equity prices and between 14 and 15 percent for op on prices. Thus, equity prices appear to be es mated
more precisely than op on prices. This can be for a number of reasons. First, trading volume is lower for
op ons than for stocks; hence microstructure eﬀects may be more signiﬁcant for the former. Also, for the
op ons we periodically change the op on series and strike price so the op on is not necessarily the same
over  me.
Figure 1: Model Fit. This shows the distribu on of mean absolute percentage errors of the actual and ﬁ ed
stock price (le  side) and the actual and ﬁ ed put op on price (right side)
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4.1 Bankruptcy costs and ﬁrm characteris cs
Our ﬁrst main ﬁnding is that implied bankruptcy costs vary quite widely in the cross-sec on of ﬁrms. Figure
2 illustrates the diﬀerences by industry classiﬁca on.10 We display the point es mates from averages across
ﬁrms in a given industry as well as the 5% conﬁdence bounds above and below. In other words, the true
industry es mate falls within the shaded bar with 95% probability. Point es mates of costs vary from less
than 10% in the case of u li es to over 60% in the coal industry. Most of the es mates are in the range
of 20-30%. Nevertheless there is huge cross-industry varia on. We ﬁnd that industries with high barriers
to entry have low bankruptcy costs. Food, tobacco, mining, and the ﬁnancial industry are examples. This
indicates that ﬁrms in such industries may con nue to operate without severe adverse impacts subsequent
10We use the Fama-French industry classiﬁca ons available on http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.
french/Data_Library/det_30_ind_port.html. We have also tried other industry classiﬁca ons but the results remain unaf-
fected. Results are available from the authors upon request.
13to bankruptcy. Bankruptcy costs are higher for ﬁrms in services, business equipment and transporta on.
One poten al reason for this ﬁnding is that they all rely on human capital and either explicit or implicit long-
term contracts with customers. Such rela onships may be irrevocably broken if the ﬁrm defaults. We look
at these rela ons more speciﬁcally in the regression framework in sec on 4.2.
Figure 2: Average Industry Distress Costs. This graph shows the percent bankruptcy costs as es mated
using Fama-French industry classiﬁca ons.The midpoint of the bar graph shows the point es mate and
two-sided 5% conﬁdence bounds are given by the red shaded area above and the blue shaded area below.
Aspartofoures ma onprocedurewederivetheunderlying(unlevered)assetvalueprocess,At. Theaverage
vola lity of this process throughout our sample is displayed by industry in Figure 3. As with the previous
ﬁgure, we display the point es mates for volia liy as well as the 5% conﬁdence bounds. In this case, the
conﬁdenceintervalsaresigniﬁcantly ghter,indica ngthatourvola lityes matesare,notsurprisingly,more
precise. We ﬁnd that point es mates of unlevered asset vola li es are around the level of 0.2. We also ﬁnd
some cross-industry varia on. Games, construc on, coal and oil are among the industries with the highest
vola lity levels. This is intui ve. U li es have a very low asset vola lity - this also accords with expecta ons.
14Figure 3: Average Industry Asset Vola lity. This graph shows the average asset vola lity es mates by Fama-
French industry classiﬁca on. The midpoint of the bar graph shows the point es mate and two-sided 5%
conﬁdence bounds are given by the red shaded area above and the blow shaded area below.
15Of course, along with bankruptcy costs, the vola lity es mates ought to ma er for leverage choices; this is
inves gated more speciﬁcally later in sec on 4.3.
We next inves gate the rela onship of bankruptcy costs with respect to "distance to default". Here we use
themeasureoriginallyemployedbyMoodys-KMVwherebywemeasurethedistanceoftheunderlyingasset
value from the bankruptcy threshold in terms of standard devia ons. Using the distance to default is one
form of a debt ra ng.11 Distance to default is deﬁned as
DTD =
lnAt   lnAB
σA
: (14)
Wesortﬁrmsintoquin les,basedontheiraveragedistancestodefault. Thenwelookforsystema cvaria on
in es mated bankruptcy costs, loss given default, leverage and asset vola lity. Our results are presented in
Table 2. For reference, the loss given default is deﬁned as
LGD = 1  
(1   α)AB
B
: (15)
Table 2: Firms are sorted into 5 quin les represen ng distance to default. The resul ng average
bankruptcy costs, LGD, leverage, and asset vola lity are displayed.
Distance to default 2.73 4.20 5.29 6.40 8.64
Bankruptcy costs 0.03 0.18 0.38 0.28 0.15
LGD 0.11 0.18 0.43 0.40 0.23
Leverage 0.73 0.62 0.56 0.54 0.55
Asset vola lity 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.21
AB=A∗
B 1.42 1.42 0.81 0.72 0.53
AB=B 0.93 1.03 1.06 0.97 0.97
We ﬁnd very plausibly that bankruptcy costs increase with ﬁrms' distances to default, at least up to a value
of ﬁve standard devia ons away from the default boundary. However, at the upper range, bankruptcy costs
are decreasing somewhat. We ﬁnd similar pa erns for the LGD: there is a strong increase of es mated LGD
withDTDovertherangewhereﬁrmshavemeasurabledefaultrisks. Firmswiththelowestdistancetodefault
tendtohavehighlevelsofleverage. Interes ngly,assetvola li esdonotvarymuchatallwithrespecttodis-
tancetodefault. FinallyTable2illustratesaninteres ngrela onshipbetweenthees matedandtheop mal
defaultthreshold. Recallthattheop maldefaultthresholdisthevalueoftheunleveredassetswhereequity
holders would ﬁnd it op mal to stop contribu ng capital to keep the ﬁrm going and to allow the debthold-
ers to assume control - mathema cally it is where the smooth-pas ng condi on holds. We ﬁnd that for
ﬁrmsclosesttodefault, thees mateddefaultthresholdisalmost50percenthigherthantheop maldefault
11We do not have data on the actual debt ra ngs of ﬁrms so we have not been able to use actual ra ngs in our analysis.
16threshold. This makes sense in the case where such ﬁrms have "precommi ed" to default earlier through
tough covenants and are thus forced into bankruptcy. However, we also ﬁnd that many ﬁrms far away from
bankruptcyhavees mateddefaultboundariesthataresigniﬁcantlybelowtheop malones. Attheextreme,
ﬁrms more than eight standard devia ons away from bankruptcy have default boundaries only 50 percent
of the op mal. These cases may represent situa ons where equityholders desire to con nue to put in capi-
tal beyond where they can expect a ﬁnancial return commensurate with their outside opportuni es. These
may be situa ons where some large shareholders may enjoy addi onal beneﬁts of ownership, or situa ons
where self-interested managers are able to persuade equity holders to con nue. Another explana on for
this ﬁnding could be that debtholders ﬁnd it in their best interest to engage in par al debt forgiveness, in-
terest reduc ons or maturity extensions, etc. since this may reduce the expected bankruptcy costs borne by
them.
Having considered some of the univariate es mates produced by our model, we now turn to some explana-
 ons and link this to the theore cal literature.
4.2 Regression Results
We now provide a linear regression analysis of the factors aﬀec ng ﬁrm bankruptcy costs, in order to be er
understand what the key determinants are. In doing so we u lize a cross-sec onal regression framework of
the following sort:
αi = β0 + β⊤
1 Yi + FEi + εi;
whereYi representsavectorofﬁrmcharacteris cs,andFEi areindustrydummies. Theexplanatoryvariables
chosenarefromthebeginningofthe meserieses ma onperiod(secondquarter2008)whichwasusedto
es matethebankruptcycosts. Someoftheexplanatoryvariablesderivefromoures ma onresults. Others
are calculated from other items such as balance sheet reports. The variables are deﬁned in Table 9 in the
appendix.
We ﬁrst present Table 3. This table contains regression es mates for α based on the smallest set of ﬁrm
characteris cs. In this case our sample size is reduced to 222 ﬁrms. We perform this regression for both the
balance sheet asset value as well as for our es mated asset value.
In this regression we depict results for both balance sheet asset values and es mated asset values as well
as with and without industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Since the adjusted R2 including industry ﬁxed eﬀects does not
increase very much, we conclude that most of the industry varia ons are already incorporated in the other
right hand side variables. We see clearly that bankruptcy cost is strongly increasing in asset vola lity. Our
simula ons in sec on 5 indicates that this rela on is not the result of a spurious correla on built into our
es ma onprocedure. Thiscouldbeduetoasymmetricinforma onsincehigherassetvola litymayreﬂecta
less liquid market for the underlying assets. Moreover, asset vola lity may result from larger growth op ons
17Table 3: Regressions of bankruptcy cost, α, on the explanatory variables of asset vola lity, asset size, tan-
gibility and the pension funding gap and the market to book ra o. The regressions are performed using
both the balance sheet asset value from accoun ng statements as well as using the es mated asset value.
The balance sheet data is from Q2 2008. Regressions are also performed with and without industry ﬁxed
eﬀects. Signiﬁcance levels are indicated by *** for signiﬁcance at the 1% level, ** for signiﬁcance at the 5%
level, and * for signiﬁcance at the 10% level. Standard errors are given in parenthesis.
Balance Sheet Asset Value Es mated Asset Value
α α α α
Constant 0.06 0.37* 0.11 0.32
(0.14) (0.20) (0.14) (0.20)
Asset Vola lity 0.52** 0.43 0.96*** 0.93***
(0.26) (0.30) (0.24) (0.29)
Log Assets -0.04 -0.07** -0.03 -0.06*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Tangibility/Assets 0.01 -0.27 -0.42*** -0.59***
(0.14) (0.17) (0.13) (0.14)
Pension Funding Gap 0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.09
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
MTB 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.05*** 0.04**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
adj R2 0.24 0.30 0.26 0.33
Ind FE N Y N Y
N 222 222 226 226
18which may not be transferable in the event of bankruptcy, implying higher costs. We ﬁnd that for two of
our speciﬁca ons size has a signiﬁcant decreasing eﬀect on bankruptcy costs. Recall that α measures pro-
por onal bankruptcy costs. Since the constant term for the regression is posi ve, absolute bankruptcy costs
are increasing in sizeup to some point and decreasingtherea er. The observa onthatbankruptcy costscan
decrease for large ﬁrms can be due to large ﬁrms having more market power, even when reorganized a er
bankruptcy. Also, in prac ce, there may be a ﬁxed cost element in bankruptcy costs, although we have mod-
eled bankruptcy costs as propor onal. Finally there can be some aspects of tangibility that may be captured
by size, e.g. brand iden ty. Our measure of tangibility illustrates that this also has independent explana-
tory power for decreasing bankruptcy costs when we use our method for es ma ng asset values. There is
obviouslya more liquid marketfortangibleassets, there arefewerinforma onal asymmetries, and the liqui-
da on value is close to book value, implying that there is less likelihood of a ``ﬁre sale'' discount. This again
accords with expecta ons. We do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant results for the pension funding gap as a descriptor for
bankruptcy costs. However, the sign is nega ve which is consistent with the predic on that higher funding
deﬁcits are a beneﬁt in bankruptcy, i.e., reduces net bankruptcy costs. Finally and importantly, the market
to book ra o enters with a posi ve sign in terms of bankruptcy costs. This provides strong direct evidence
that growth op ons are expected to be lost in the event of bankruptcy.
Our most complete set of regression es mates is contained in Table 4. Using this larger set of regressors,
we have a reduced sample size of only 99 ﬁrms. Note that now the adjusted R2 actually declines with ﬁxed
eﬀects showing that there is no inter-industry varia on that is not already incorporated. We ﬁnd broadly
similar results with respect to the original set of regressors. While labor intensity is not signiﬁcant in any
of the speciﬁca ons it does enter with a nega ve sign. This is consistent with the idea that labor costs are
expected to be reduced in the event of bankruptcy. Also, R&D/assets seems to have a nega ve eﬀect on
bankruptcycostsas well. This pointsout thatnot all beneﬁtsfromgrowthopportuni es arelostin the event
of bankruptcy. For instance, if R&D/assets is correlated with patents and these are transferable then these
assets are not reduced in value when bankruptcy occurs.
In summary we have found that bankruptcy costs increase with cash ﬂow risk, while they decrease with ﬁrm
size as well as with asset tangibility. Moreover es mated costs increase strongly with market to book ra os,
indica ng that overall growth op ons are lost in bankruptcy. Finally we ﬁnd that bankruptcy costs do vary
widely amongst industries as indicated by the fact that industry dummies increase the explanatory power
(R2) signiﬁcantly.
4.3 Regression results on leverage
We now employ a similar cross-sec onal regression framework to analyze the impact of ﬁrm characteris cs
on observed leverage ra os, where importantly we employ our es mates for bankruptcy costs in addi on
to the other variables. By virtue of our ﬁrm speciﬁc bankruptcy cost es mates, our model is the ﬁrst to
19Table 4: The regression of es mated bankruptcy cost, α, for each ﬁrm on ﬁrm characteris cs. The charac-
teris c variables are deﬁned in the text. The regression is done using both the balance sheet value for total
assets as well as the es mated asset value. The regression is done with and without industry ﬁxed eﬀects.
The balance sheet data is from Q2 2008. Signiﬁcance at the 1% level is indicated by *** while signiﬁcance
at the 5% level is indicated with ** and * denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level. Standard errors are given in
parenthesis.
Balance Sheet Asset Value Es mated Asset Value
α α α α
Constant 0.60** 0.87** 0.72*** 0.87**
(0.25) (0.37) (0.26) (0.39)
Asset Vola lity 0.24 0.19 0.72* 0.63
(0.39) (0.46) (0.39) (0.47)
Log Assets -0.16*** -0.17*** -0.15*** -0.15**
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Tangibility/Assets -0.05 -0.16 -0.56** -0.66**
(0.23) (0.27) (0.25) (0.30)
Labor Intensity -11.04 -40.23* -10.64 -30.14
(9.68) (22.55) (9.94) (23.57)
R&D/Assets -4.40* -4.83 -4.21 -4.20
(2.62) (3.49) (4.22) (5.87)
Pension Funding Gap -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03
(0.15) (0.19) (0.16) (0.19)
MTB 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.07** 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
adj R2 0.29 0.26 0.25 0.22
Ind FE N Y N Y
N 99 99 100 100
20actually include bankruptcy cost directly in a true cross sec onal framework. Exis ng studies of leverage
determinants either ignore bankruptcy costs or have had to resort to conjectured proxies.
We also include ﬁrm proﬁt as another explanatory variable, as there is substan al evidence in the literature
that it aﬀects leverage. Finally the market to book ra o is also included. Proﬁtability and market to book are
deﬁned in the appendix.
Before discussing the regression results we also deﬁne three leverage ra os, based on common approaches
in the literature. The ﬁrst measure is deﬁned as market leverage (ML), which is the ra o of the market value
of debt and the market value of the levered ﬁrm using our es ma on approach for both. We also employ
quasi market leverage (QML) which is the book value of debt divided by the sum of the book value of debt
plus the market value of equity. This approach therefore assumes that the book value of debt is equal to
its market value. The ﬁnal leverage measure is standard book leverage (BL), the ra o of book debt to total
assets at book.
The leverage es ma on is given as:
levi = β0 + FEi + β⊤
1 Yi + εi;
where again Yi represents a vector of ﬁrm characteris cs (including bankruptcy costs, etc.) and the le  hand
side variable is one of the three leverage speciﬁca ons (ML, QML and BL). Leverage ra os were calculated
with market and balance sheet data from the end of the third quarter 2008 and explanatory variables are
based on data from the end of the second quarter 2008.
First,withrespecttomarketleverage,weobtaintheregressionresultsofTable5. Weno cemostimportantly
that bankruptcy costs enter with a signiﬁcantly nega ve sign in the leverage ra o regression. This is the
ﬁrst direct evidence that the tradeoﬀ theory of capital structure holds with respect to bankruptcy costs.
We also ﬁnd very signiﬁcant nega ve eﬀects from asset vola lity. As before, sec on 5 shows that these
results are not driven by spurious correla on induced by the es ma on procedure. Most extant tests in the
literature use accoun ng measures of asset vola lity as derived for instance from earnings announcements
or from the vola lity of net-opera ng proﬁts. There is weak and mixed evidence on the impact of vola lity
on leverage ra os. By contrast, we use a market-based measure of unlevered asset vola lity. The strong
nega ve eﬀect from asset vola lity also supports the tradeoﬀ theory for capital structure since the higher
thevola litythehigher(foragivenassetassetvalue)istheprobabilityofdefaultandthereforethehigherare
expected bankruptcy costs. Leverage is strongly posi vely related to tangibility, when assets are measured
through our es ma on procedure. We also ﬁnd that leverage is nega vely related to proﬁtability, especially
whenproﬁtabilityismeasuredwithrespecttoes matedassetvalues. Ourproﬁtabilityresultsareconsistent
with ﬁndings in much of the exis ng empirical capital structure literature. Finally, we ﬁnd strong evidence
that market to book ra os are associated with lower debt ra os. This is especially true when we eliminate
asset vola lity and bankruptcy costs themselves from the set of regressors. We ﬁnd that growth op ons
can therefore have two eﬀects on capital structure. One eﬀect is the increase in bankruptcy costs already
21discussed; thesecondis anaddi onalfactor, such asunderinvestmentor otherleveragerelatedopportunity
costs.
We repeat the regression analysis in Table 6 where leverage is measured by QML. Most of our previous re-
sults with market leverage are preserved in this speciﬁca on. Although proﬁtability becomes insigniﬁcant, it
retainsthesamenega vesign. Weﬁndthesameresultswithrespecttobookleveragera osinTable7, with
the excep on of the market to book ra o. While the market to book ra o, as a measure of investment op-
portuni es,isnega velyrelatedtomarketbasedleveragedeﬁni onsitisposi velyrelatedtobookleverage.
This dichotomy of results regarding the leverage-proﬁtability rela on when leverage is measured by market
values instead of book values has also been documented in the exis ng literature.12
In summary, we ﬁnd that lower asset value risk implies a higher leverage ra o, a result that has not been
documented in the exis ng literature. Tangibility of assets has a posi ve eﬀect on leverage ra os. Firm
size also enters in a posi ve way. Because both vola lity and tangibility are separately controlled for, this
represents a clean size eﬀect that is not reﬂected otherwise. The market to book ra o has a nega ve eﬀect
on leverage as measured by market values but has a posi ve eﬀect when using book leverage. Overall, the
inclusion of the two new variables, ﬁrm-speciﬁc bankruptcy costs and ﬁrm-speciﬁc asset vola lity explains
the cross-sec on of leverage ra os much be er than previous papers.
4.4 Hidden Debt
For our empirical analysis we took the debt level from the balance sheet of the ﬁrms and es mated, among
otherthings,thedefaultthresholdimpliedbyobservedmarketprices. Wedidnotrequirethatthees mated
default threshold be equal to the one that would be op mal for equityholders in the theore cal model, i.e.
the one where the smooth-pas ng condi on is sa sﬁed. In fact, we found considerable devia ons from this
``op mal''defaultthreshold. Asdiscussedabove,covenantsandagencyconsidera onsmayplayaroleinthis
discrepancy. Another possibility, however, is, that the true set of liabili es faced by equityholders is not fully
reﬂected in the accoun ng statements of the ﬁrm. For example, since our sample consists mostly of large
US corpora ons, health care obliga ons can be an important liability omi ed from the balance sheet. To
inves gate this, we explore the presence of such hidden debts. In order to implement this, we now assume
that the actual default threshold equals the op mal threshold for equityholders inclusive of these hidden
debts. Therefore we solve equa on (5) for the B which equates the theore cal with the es mated default
barrier. We denote this implicit face value of total liabili es by BH. Therefore BH sa sﬁes
BH =
1
m
([
(1 + (1   α)η(z) + αη(r))A∗
B +
τC
r
η(r)
]
r + m
η(z)
  C
)
:
For most of the ﬁrms in our sample, BH is greater than B, consistent with the existence of hidden debts. This
12See for instanceFrank & Goyal (2009) and Fama & French (2002).
22Table 5: This table contains the results for a regression of market leverage (ML) on various ﬁrm character-
is c variables as indicated in the rows of the table. The variable deﬁni ons are in the text. The regression
is performed for both ﬁrm characteris cs using both balance sheet asset values and the asset values es-
 mated from the model. The explanatory variables are from Q2 2008, the leverage ra os are calculated
with Q3 2008 data. Signiﬁcance levels are indicated by *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%. Standard er-
rors are given in parenthesis.
Balance Sheet Asset Value Es mated Asset Value
ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML
Constant 0.61*** 0.67*** 0.44*** 0.40*** 0.62*** 0.70*** 0.43*** 0.36***
(0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11)
Asset Vola lity -0.72*** -0.68*** -0.88*** -0.95***
(0.16) (0.19) (0.15) (0.18)
α -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.09**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Log Assets 0.03* 0.02 0.06*** 0.05** 0.01 0.01 0.04** 0.05***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Tang w Cash 0.18** 0.19* 0.06 0.13 0.53*** 0.59*** 0.49*** 0.55***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Labor Intensity 3.95 -5.64 3.70 -4.91 4.50 -5.14 4.35 -3.73
(2.94) (6.63) (3.20) (7.04) (2.74) (6.05) (3.04) (6.57)
Pension Funding Gap 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Proﬁtability -1.03* -1.56** -1.25** -1.80*** -2.19** -2.85*** -2.99*** -3.51***
(0.57) (0.64) (0.62) (0.68) (0.91) (0.99) (1.00) (1.07)
MTB -0.04** -0.03 -0.07*** -0.05** -0.02 -0.02 -0.08*** -0.06***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
adj R2 0.43 0.48 0.32 0.41 0.50 0.56 0.39 0.48
Ind FE N Y N Y N Y N Y
N 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220
23Table 6: This table contains the results for a regression of quasi market leverage (QML) on various ﬁrm
characteris c variables as indicated in the rows of the table. The variable deﬁni ons are in the text. The
regression is performed for both ﬁrm characteris cs using both balance sheet asset values and the asset
values es mated from the model. The explanatory variables are from Q2 2008, the leverage ra os are cal-
culated with Q3 2008 data. Signiﬁcance levels are indicated by *** for 1%, ** for 5% and * for 10%. Stan-
dard errors are given in parenthesis.
Balance Sheet Asset Value Es mated Asset Value
QML QML QML QML QML QML QML QML
Constant 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.48*** 0.52*** 0.32*** 0.32***
(0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Asset Vola lity -0.65*** -0.39*** -0.83*** -0.64***
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)
α -0.07** -0.06* -0.04 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Log Assets 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.03** 0.03** 0.05*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Tang w Cash 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.14* 0.24*** 0.54*** 0.55*** 0.48*** 0.51***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Labor Intensity 0.67 -4.31 0.63 -3.94 0.90 -4.70 0.88 -3.85
(2.42) (5.09) (2.59) (5.22) (2.27) (4.74) (2.51) (4.98)
Pension Funding Gap 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Proﬁtability -1.19** -1.36*** -1.30** -1.45*** -1.40* -1.52* -2.08** -1.92**
(0.47) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.76) (0.78) (0.83) (0.81)
MTB -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.10*** -0.09***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
adj R2 0.60 0.68 0.55 0.67 0.65 0.73 0.57 0.70
Ind FE N Y N Y N Y N Y
N 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220
24Table 7: This table contains the results for a regression of book leverage (BL) on various ﬁrm characteris-
 c variables as indicated in the rows of the table. The variable deﬁni ons are in the text. The regression
is performed for both ﬁrm characteris cs using both balance sheet asset values and the asset values es-
 mated from the model. The explanatory variables are from Q2 2008, the leverage ra os are calculated
with Q3 2008 data. Signiﬁcance levels are indicated by *** for 1%, ** for 5% and * for 10%. Standard er-
rors are given in parenthesis.
Balance Sheet Asset Value Es mated Asset Value
BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL
Constant 0.63*** 0.68*** 0.31*** 0.27** 0.71*** 0.81*** 0.39*** 0.34**
(0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.14) (0.10) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
Asset Vola lity -1.46*** -1.29*** -1.59*** -1.43***
(0.18) (0.20) (0.18) (0.21)
α -0.12*** -0.08* -0.10** -0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Log Assets 0.03 0.03* 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.00 0.02 0.05** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Tang w Cash 0.22** 0.40*** -0.01 0.26** 0.40*** 0.50*** 0.30*** 0.39***
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
Labor Intensity 4.08 -10.80 4.01 -10.01 4.34 -11.60* 4.21 -9.76
(3.28) (6.97) (3.84) (7.80) (3.23) (6.89) (3.86) (7.77)
Pension Funding Gap -0.01 -0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.08 -0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Proﬁtability -1.66** -1.65** -1.84** -1.77** -1.66 -1.57 -2.93** -2.43*
(0.64) (0.68) (0.74) (0.75) (1.08) (1.13) (1.28) (1.26)
MTB 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.01 0.04**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
adj R2 0.31 0.45 0.06 0.31 0.33 0.45 0.04 0.30
Ind FE N Y N Y N Y N Y
N 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220
25is true whenever the es mated default threshold is higher than the op mal default threshold, using balance
sheet liabili es. However, some mes BH is less than B, and in some cases BH is even nega ve (for 49 ﬁrms
this is indeed the case).
One hypothesis for the existence of nega ve hidden debts is that ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress may be able to
recontract with par es, such as their employees, under more favorable terms. Indeed this seems to have
beenthecaseformanyoftheairlinebankruptciesthathaveoccurredinrecentyears,e.g. AmericanAirlines.
For a theory on this subject, see Berk et al. (2010).
Figure 4 displays the distribu on of the ra os of implied to balance sheet liabili es, BH=B. We conjecture
that in par cular ﬁrms with large legacy costs due to re rees as well as other former employees would be
candidatestohavenega vehiddendebts. Also,ﬁrmswithrela velyhighlaborcostswithinanindustrywould
be candidates to have nega ve hidden debts, since ﬁnancial distress allows these ﬁrms to recontract.
Figure 4: Hidden Debt. This illustrates a histogram of the ra os of the total es mated debt levels (including
hidden debt) divided by the balance sheet value of debt.
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5 Robustness
Wewouldliketouseourstructuralmodeltounderstandhowtheempiricalﬁndings,inpar cularthenega ve
rela onshipbetweenleverageandassetvola lityandbetweenleverageandbankruptcycosts,arerelatedto
26ﬁrms' capital structure decisions. We note that our es ma on method does not impose on ﬁrms that they
make either sta c or dynamically op mal capital structure decisions. All that is required by the framework
of Leland that we employ is that the book value of debt stays constant over the es ma on period. In order
to interpret our results as evidence in favor of op mal capital structure decisions, it is therefore necessary
to show that our rela onships are not present in the absence of op mizing behavior.
First, we would like to explore to what extent the strong nega ve rela on between asset vola lity and lever-
age could be showing up even if ﬁrms are not op mally choosing their leverage ra os at the beginning of
the sample period. To this end, we ﬁx the book leverage and then derive market and quasi market leverage
ra os from our theore cal pricing model for a representa ve ﬁrm with diﬀerent unlevered asset vola li es.
Figure 5 depicts the eﬀect of asset vola lity on market and quasi market-leverage, produced by the impact
of asset vola lity on theore cal equity and debt values via the default threshold and probability of default.
Note that the slope is slightly nega ve, it is essen ally zero for both market and quasi-market leverage ra os
compared to the signiﬁcantly nega ve empirical es mates.
Figure 5: Leverage vs. Asset Volala lity. This graph illustustrates the theore cal rela onship between asset
vola lity on market leverage (blue, lower line) and on quasi market leverage (green upper line).
We have performed a similar exercise with respect to bankruptcy costs. Here, for ﬁxed nominal debt levels,
the theore cal rela onship is actually posi ve, whereas the empirical evidence is strongly nega ve.
27Second, we want to ensure that the observed nega ve rela on between leverage and asset vola lity and
leverage and bankruptcy costs is not purely an ar fact of our es ma on procedure. To check whether the
pronounced nega ve rela on between leverage and asset vola lity or bankruptcy costs is generated ar ﬁ-
cially we test our es ma on method on simulated data. We construct a sample of ﬁrms which, by assump-
 on, does not exhibit a nega ve correla on between leverage and asset vola lity or bankruptcy costs. For
all ﬁrms, the asset vola lity and the bankruptcy costs are the same but the book value of debt varies. Given
these parameters we simulate sample paths of equity and op on prices for 60 ﬁrms. Then we es mate the
structural parameters of the ﬁrms in the same fashion as we did for the actual data.
Figure 6 depicts the outcome of the simula on with respect to es mated vola li es. The blue points repre-
sent the true quasi market leverage ra os of the ﬁrms in the simula on. The vola lity was ﬁxed at σ = 0:2
while the market leverage ra o varied between lev = 0:58 and lev = 0:72 for the simulated ﬁrms. The red
points depict the corresponding es mated values of asset vola lity. The correla on between es mated as-
setvola li esandes matedmarketleverageisclosetozero(0:03),indica ngthatthees ma onprocedure
does not impose the documented nega ve correla on between these two variables. Similarly 7 illustrates
Figure 6: Leverage vs. Asset Vola lity. This illustrates the results of a simula on study in which sixty ar ﬁ-
cial ﬁrms were simulated with diﬀerent leverage ra os but the same asset vola lity. The linear blue dots
indicate the true values and the red random dots indicate the results from the simula on.
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the es mates of bankruptcy cost obtained by simula ng all 60 ﬁrms in the study. The true bankruptcy cost
value is ﬁxed at α = 0:25. The blue points represent the true values, while the red points indicate the es-
 mated bankruptcy cost values. While there is more es ma on error in determining the bankruptcy cost
than with respect to unlevered asset vola li es, there is no no ceable bias in the es mates. The correla-
 on between bankruptcy costs and leverage is somewhat higher than that for vola li es ( 0:07) but also
28insigniﬁcant. Table8summarizestheresultsofoursimula onstudy. Sincethemeanofthees matesequals
Figure 7: Leverage vs. Bankruptcy Costs. This illustrates the results of a simula on study in which sixty ar-
 ﬁcial ﬁrms were simulated with diﬀerent leverage ra os but the same bankruptcy cost. The linear blue
dots indicate the true values and the red random dots indicate the results from the simula on.
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exactly the true values for vola lity and bankruptcy cost, there is no bias in either. The mean squared errors
forvola lityarelowerthanforthebankruptcycosts. Nevertheless,thesquarerootoftheMSEforbankruptcy
cost is a small frac on of the average es mate. This table also reports the correla ons with leverage and the
cross-correla on and shows that they are all insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero using a t-test.
Table 8: Simula on Results: This table reports the results of a simula on study in which sixty ar ﬁcial ﬁrms
were simulated with diﬀerent leverage ra os but the same asset vola lity and bankruptcy cost.
Es ma on Correla on with
true value mean
p
MSE leverage t-stat asset vola lity t-stat
asset vola lity 0.20 0.20 0.01 0.03 0.21
bankruptcy cost 0.25 0.25 0.04 -0.07 -0.53 -0.16 -1.19
Wehavealso computedthe conﬁdencebounds forboth bankruptcycostand vola lityin the simula on. We
ﬁnd that 95% of the  me, the bankruptcy cost is between 0:20 and 0:31 while the true value is 0:25. For
asset vola li es, the 95% conﬁdence band is between 0:19 and 0:22 for a true value of 0:20.
Third, we want to test whether the posi ve rela onship between a ﬁrm's bankruptcy costs and its asset
vola litydocumentedintable3isaspuriousresultofthees ma onprocedure. Thecorrela onbetweenthe
true bankruptcy costs and asset vola li es is zero in our simulated sample of 60 ﬁrms, because both values
areﬁxedasconstants. Astable8reports, theslightlynega vecorrela onofthees matedparametersisnot
29signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This is also illustrated in ﬁgure 8.
Figure 8: Bankruptcy Costs vs Asset Vola lity: This illustrates the results of a simula on study in which sixty
ar ﬁcial ﬁrms were simulated with diﬀerent leverage ra os but the same bankruptcy cost and asset vola l-
ity. The true values for asset vola lity and bankruptcy cost are 0:2 and 0:25 and are represented by the
crossing point of the blue lines. The red random dots indicate the results from the es ma on.
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6 Conclusions
As part of the literature on capital structure, the issue of the magnitude of bankruptcy costs has been recog-
nizedashavingfundamentalimportance. Inordertoreconcileobserveddebtlevels, ifthereisanyrelevance
to the tradeoﬀ theory of capital structure, bankruptcy costs should be economically signiﬁcant. However
measuring these costs has been fraught with considerable diﬃculty. For one thing, there are small samples
of ﬁrms that have actually gone bankrupt. For another, observing total bankruptcy costs is not easy and
o en omits indirect and opportunity costs. Finally, there is a well-known selec on bias in extending ex post
observa ons to ex ante expecta ons.
This paper has taken a novel approach to this cri cal subject. We have u lized a broad based sample of
S&P 500 ﬁrms in 2007, and applied a new method for inferring bankruptcy costs from equity and equity-
linked put op on prices during 2008 to 2010. Unlike previous approaches, our sample does not suﬀer by
30only considering highly levered ﬁrms or ones that have gone bankrupt. While it may appear unusual to
base bankruptcy cost es mates on prices of residual claimants whose claims are worthless no ma er what
happens in bankruptcy, we are able to do so by using a structural model of capital structure dynamics. In
this model, old debt is con nually reﬁnanced and the surplus or deﬁcit accrues to equityholders. As a result
equity valua ons are a func on of ex post bankruptcy costs as measured by a percentage of asset values at
the onset of the bankruptcy process. The use of put op ons is shown to be integral to the implementa on
of the method as these are even more sensi ve to bankruptcy probabili es, traded on organized exchanges
as standardized contracts and are liquid. This avoids the need to rely on debt prices such as CDS which
unfortunately do not fully reﬂect the heterogeneity of debt structures, and are subject to counterparty risk.
We illustrate the eﬃcacy of our method by u lizing data from the ﬁnancial crisis period, which was charac-
terizedbywildswingsinstockmarkets. Applyingthises ma onprocedureusingKalmanﬁlteringtechniques
givesspeciﬁces matesthatarereasonableandsigniﬁcantinmagnitude--averaging20%ofunleveredasset
values. Our paper thus provides the ﬁrst broad based study of ex ante bankruptcy cost es mates by industry
and illustrates considerable varia on. We perform a cross-sec onal analysis to uncover the determinants
of bankruptcy costs. We found that asset vola lity and growth op ons as measured by market to book ra-
 os have signiﬁcant posi ve impacts, while tangibility and size have nega ve impacts. Less signiﬁcant are
pension deﬁcits and labor intensity. It is important to our conclusions that standard ﬁrm characteris c vari-
ables do not fully explain our bankruptcy cost es mates. This implies that our new method has poten al in
augmen ng tests for capital structure theories.
Inordertoopera onalizethisidea,weperformatruedirectcross-sec onaltestofthedeterminantsoflever-
agera osduring2008. Weaugmentourregressorsconsis ngofﬁrmcharacteris cvariablesbyincludingthe
ﬁrm-speciﬁc bankruptcy cost es mates and show that explanatory power is signiﬁcantly larger. As another
byproduct from our approach, we are able to es mate market values for debt securi es, thus enabling us
to analyze market leverage ra os in addi on to book leverage ra os. Our bankruptcy cost variable es mate
signiﬁcantly nega vely impacts leverage ra os. This nega ve impact is over and above that of other ﬁrm
characteris cs such as asset intangibility and asset vola lity. We also ﬁnd a nega ve leverage proﬁtability
rela onship using market leverage values, consistent with earlier literature. In sum, we ﬁnd strong support
for the tradeoﬀ theory of capital structure.
Inaﬁnalapplica onofourmethod,weinferhiddendebtsthatarenotpresentonbalancesheetsinanyway.
These are debts which could conceivably be expunged in bankruptcy that may reduce net bankruptcy costs.
Thebestexamplesarelongtermlegacycontractsthatmaynotreﬂectcurrentlabormarketcondi ons. While
there is more room for work in this area, we believe that our study supports the view that hidden debts can
be another signiﬁcant factor in explaining likelihoods and consequences of bankruptcy.
31A Deriva on of the Put Pricing Formula
Let(Ω;F;F;P)beaﬁlteredprobabilityspacewiththeﬁltra onF = fFt : t  0ggeneratedbytheBrownian
mo on WP
t, and let Q  P be the mar ngale measure with the risk-free bank account as the numeraire. The
Q-dynamics of the unlevered asset value process At are given by
dAt =
(
μB +
σ2
2
)
Atdt + σAtdWt (16)
where Wt is a Q-Wiener process and μB = r   δ   σ2
2 is the dri  of lnAt.
The payoﬀ of a put op on, (17), depends on whether the underlying ﬁrm has defaulted or not:
PT = (K   S(AT))+1TB>T + K1TB≤T (17)
In order to derive the price of the op on at  me 0, we ﬁrst deﬁne A∗ as the  me-T unlevered asset value
suchthattheop onisatthemoney(S(T;A∗) = K). Ifmarketsarearbitragefree,theputpricecanbewri en
as the discounted expected value of the payoﬀ, with the risk-free rate serving as the discount rate under the
risk-neutral measure Q:
P0 =e−rTEQ
0 [(K   S(AT))1AT≤A∧TB>T] + Ke−rTEQ [1TB≤T] (18)
with the stock price given by
S(AT) =AT +
τC
r
[1   G(T;AT)]   αABG(T;AT)
 
C + mB
z
[1   Gz(T;AT)]   (1   α)ABGz(T;AT)
The pricing formula (18) includes the stochas c variable AT, as well as G(T;AT) and Gz(T;AT) which are non-
linear func ons of AT together with the indicator func on 1YT where YT = fAT  A∗ ^ TB > Tg is the event
that the op on is in the money and the ﬁrm has not defaulted prior to maturity of the op on. As the put
formula can be expressed as terms involving the payoﬀs AT1YT, G(T;AT)1YT, and Gz(T;AT)1YT we will derive
their me-0valuesexplicitlyinthenextthreelemmas. Tofacilitatecalcula onswewillchangetheprobability
measure by choosing convenient likelihood processes (see Ericsson & Reneby, 1998, 2003, for a discussion
of this approach). We make sure that the likelihood processes are chosen in such a way as to guarantee that
thenewmeasuresarealsoprobabilitymeasures. Inaddi on,thenewmeasureswillbemar ngalemeasures
with AT, G(T;AT), and Gz(T;AT) as the respec ve numeraires. Finally, Girsanov's theorem (see Duﬃe, 2001,
app D) will tell us the dri  rate of At under the new measures.
The ﬁrst term involves the  me-T value of the unlevered asset price. For this transforma on we use the
unlevered asset value as 'numeraire'.
32Lemma A.1 The price of the  me-T payoﬀ AT1YT at  me 0 is given by
EQ
0
[
e−rTAT1YT
]
= A0e−δTQA(YT) (19)
with the likelihood process
LA
Q(t) =
dQA
dQ
; on Ft; 0  t  T
given by
LA
Q(t) =
Ateδt
BtA(0)
The Girsanov kernel for the transi on from Q to QA is equal to σ which changes the dri  of A under QA to
μA = μB + σ2
Proof The Likelihood process LA
Q(t) = Ateδt
BtA(0) is a Q-mar ngale and EQ
0
[
LA
Q(T)
]
= 1. The pricing formula (19)
follows from EQ
0
[
e−rTAT1YT
]
= EA
0
[
LQ
A(T)e−rTAT1YT
]
where LQ
A(t) = 1
LA
Q(t).
EQ
0
[
e−rTAT1YT
]
=EA
0
[
BTA0e−δT
B0AT
e−rTAT1YT
]
=A0e−δTEA
0 [1YT]
=A0e−δTQA(YT) (20)
Toderivethepriceofthefuture$1in-defaultclaim,weusethisclaimitselftofactoritoutoftheexpecta on.
Lemma A.2 The price of the  me-T payoﬀ G(T;AT)1YT at  me 0 is given by
EQ
0
[
e−rTG(T;AT)1YT
]
= G(0;A0)QG(YT) (21)
In this case, the likelihood process is given by
LG
Q(t) =
G(t;At)
BtG(0;A0)
The Girsanov kernel for the transi on from Q to QG is equal to  η(r)σ which changes the dri  of A under QG
to
μG = μB   η(r)σ2
33Proof The steps of the proof are the same as for lemma A.1.
The ﬁnal term involves Gz(T;VT) which is a claim to e−m(TB−T) dollars if the ﬁrm defaults at TB.
Lemma A.3 The price of the  me-T payoﬀ Gz(T;AT)1YT at  me 0 is given by
EQ
0
[
e−rTGz(T;AT)1YT
]
= emTGz(0;A0)Qz(YT) (22)
with the likelihood process given by
Lz
Q(t) =
Gz(t;At)e−mt
BtGz(0;A0)
The Girsanov kernel for the transi on from Q to Qz is equal to  η(z)σ which changes the dri  of A under Qz
to
μz = μB   η(z)σ2
Proof The steps of the proof are the same as for lemma A.1.
The put pricing formula contains the probability of the event Yt evaluated under diﬀerent mar ngale mea-
sures with respect to diﬀerent numeraires, namely, At, G(t;At), and Gz(t;At). The probabili es Q(AT),
QA(AT), QG(AT), and Qz(AT) can be easily derived from the density of an absorbed Brownian mo on with
the respec ve dri  rates ^ μ, μA, μG, and μz (e.g. Bjoerk, 2004, ch 18).
Using the previous results, the price of the put op on is stated in the following proposi on:
Proposi on A.4 Given the Q-dynamics of At in (16), the price of the put op on with  me-T payoﬀ deﬁned in
(17) is
Pt =e−r(T−t)K(Q(YT) + Q(TB < T))   Ate−δ(T−t)QA(YT)
 
τC
r
(
e−r(T−t)Q(YT)   G(t;At)QG(YT)
)
+ αABG(t;At)QG(YT)
+
C + mB
z
(
e−r(T−t)Q(YT)   em(T−t)Gz(t;At)Qz(YT)
)
+ (1   α)ABem(T−t)Gz(t;At)Qz(YT) (23)
B The Unscented Kalman Filter
Our model has the following state space representa on:
xt = A + Fxt−1 + εt (24)
yt = g(xt) (25)
34As explained in sec on 3.1, the state equa on comprises the process for the unlevered asset value and the
AR(1) speciﬁca on for the pricing errors, i.e. xt = (vt;eS
t;eP
t)′, where vt is the log asset-value and eS
t;eP
t are
the pricing errors for the stock and the put price. Therefore, the covariance matrix of the state equa on
errors (Q) contains the asset vola lity and the variance of the noise terms in the pricing error processes.
Q = E
[
εε′]
=

 

σ2
V 0 0
0 σ2
S 0
0 0 σ2
P

 
 (26)
The measurement equa on (25), which summarizes equa on (10) in vector form, contains the two observ-
ablesecurityprices,thestockpriceandtheputop onprice(yt = (si;t;pi;t)′). Thenonlinearpricingfunc ons
g can be further simpliﬁed to gi(xt;θ) =  gi(vt;θ) + ei
t, i 2 fS;Pg with only vt entering the non linear part.
Asthestateequa on(24)islinear, thestatepropaga onisthesameasinthelinearKalmanﬁlter. Therefore,
the update of the state variable and its mean squared error matrix (MSE), Pt|t−1, is given by:
^ xt|t−1 = A + B^ xt|t
Pt|t−1 = FPt|tF′ + Q
(27)
The measurement update, however, diﬀers, since the state variables enter in a non linear way in the mea-
surement equa on (25). To approximate the distribu on of yt, which is a non linear transforma on of the
distribu on of xt, we rely on the unscented Kalman ﬁlter (see Wan & Van Der Merwe, 2001, for a detailed
descrip on) to give us an approxima on for the mean and the covariance matrix. The unscented transfor-
ma on captures the true mean and covariance matrix of the prices accurately to the third order (ifVt where
not Gaussian, then to the second order). Figure 9 depicts the gain in accuracy obtained by the use of the
unscented transforma on.
We construct 2L + 1 sigma vectors, χi, where L = 2 is the number of state variables. The sigma vectors are
chosen in such a way that the mean and the covariance matrix of yt is approximated accurately up to the
third order. Each sigma vector comes with corresponding weights, Wm
i and Wc
i, to calculate the mean and
the covariance matrix is the weighted average of the sigma points. The sigma vectors and weights are given
by
χ0 = ^ xt|t−1 Wm
0 = λ
λ+L Wc
0 = λ
λ+L + 1   α2 + β
χi = ^ xt|t−1 +
√
(L + λ)(Pt|t−1)i Wm
i = Wc
i = 1
2(λ+L) i = 1;:::;L
χi = ^ xt|t−1  
√
(L + λ)(Pt|t−1)i−L Wm
i = Wc
i = 1
2(λ+L) i = L + 1;:::;2L
(28)
35Figure 9: Example for the unscented transforma on for mean and covariance propaga on comparing ac-
tual moments to moments derived under ﬁrst-order lineariza on (extended Kalman ﬁlter), and unscented
Kalman ﬁlter. Source: Wan & Van Der Merwe (2001).
36where λ = α2(L + κ)   L, β = 2, and α... The non-linear func on g is than applied to the sigma vectors
yi = g(χi), i = 0;:::;2L. The measurement update is then given by
^ yt|t−1 =
2L ∑
i=0
Wm
i yi
Ψt =
2L ∑
i=0
Wc
i(yi  ^ yt|t−1)(yi  ^ yt|t−1)′
P
xy
t|t−1 =
2L ∑
i=0
Wc
i(χi  ^ xt|t−1)(yi  ^ yt|t−1)′
Kt = P
xy
t|t−1Ψ−1
^ xt|t = ^ xt|t−1 + Kt(yt  ^ yt|t−1)
Pt|t = Pt|t−1 + KtΨtK′
t
Finally, the log-likelihood func on is given by
lt(^ θ) =  
1
2
logjΨtj  
1
2
(yt  ^ yt|t−1)Ψ−1
t (yt  ^ yt|t−1)′ (29)
37C Descrip on of Regressors
Table 9: This table contains the descrip on of all variables used in the regressions of bankruptcy costs and
leverage ra os.
Variable Descrip on
Firm size Logarithm of total assets; we either use the balance sheet value
of total assets or our es mate of the unlevered asset value.
Tangibility/Assets Tangibility is quan ﬁed by the measure from Berger et al. (1996)
which was also used in Almeida & Campello (2007). The mea-
sure is deﬁned as Tangibility = 0:715  Receivables + 0:547 
Inventory+0:535Capital, where Capital equals property, plant
and equipment. Cash holdings are added to this value and the
sum is scaled by total assets
Labor intensity Number of employees over sales.
R&D/Assets R&Dexpensesovertotalassetswhereassetseithercorrespondto
thebalancesheetvalueortothees matedunleveredassetvalue.
Pension funding gap FollowingRauh(2009)weconstructameasureofthepensiongap
as the ra o of pension assets minus pension liabili es to pension
liabili es. Pension assets correspond to the fair value of plan as-
sets and pension liabili es to the projected beneﬁt obliga on.
Proﬁtability Proﬁtabilityequalsa er-taxopera ngincomebeforedeprecia on
dividedbytotalassetstakeneitherfromthebalancesheetorfrom
the es ma on results.
MTB Market-to-book ra o is deﬁned in the numerator by the market
value of equity + short-term debt + long term debt + preferred
liquida on value - deferred taxes and investment tax credits. In
the denominator the book value of total assets is used.
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